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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Concl4sion
The attempts to avoid conflict between federal and state judi-
ciaries have been responsible for a disproportionate amount of liti-
gation. It may well be one of the prices that must be paid for our
rather unique form of government; on the other hand, it may be
nothing more than the price that must be paid when a desirable end
is sought to be attained through diverse and incongruous means.
Congressional abnegation is undoubtedly responsible in at least a
small way. This is not to say that the courts should abdicate their
functions, but if the judges are going to base their decisions on the
"intent" of Congress, that intent should be manifested as explicitly
and, when necessary, as often as possible.
Congress has seemingly risen to the occasion with the Landrum-
Griffin Act. It is only urged that, if clarification of this legislation
is necessary, and it seems upon analysis that clarification will be
necessary, Congress again rise to the occasion and express such
clarification.
SCOPE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
Introduction
One of the most perplexing problems presented by a commercial
arbitration clause is the scope of its applicability. The scope of the
agreement will be discussed with respect to the type of agreement
used and to the conflict of laws' difficulties presented by the choice
of forum. This latter point will be limited to a consideration of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 1 and the New York Arbitration Act
of 1920.2 An attempt will be made to discover the boundaries of
such agreements within the confines of the law and within the agree-
ment itself. This article will consider that problem as it appears in
a "future disputes" agreement, which is generally incorporated into
the primary contract,3 rather than in a submission which is a post-
19 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). The Federal Act as originally enacted made
"future disputes" agreements valid, irrevocable and enforceable. 43 Stat. 883(1925).
2 N.Y. Crv. PPAc. Acr §§ 1448-69. The New York Act was amended in
1937 to provide that "future disputes" agreements were valid, enforceable
and irrevocable. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 341, at 882.
SAMERICAN ARin=AroN AssoCToN, COMMERCIAL ARmTRATI ON Rm.as 2
(1954). A standard "future disputes" arbitration agreement supplied by the
American Arbitration Association is as follows:
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dispute agreement. 4 This limitation is imposed because "future
disputes" agreements, which are widely employed today, present the
greater problem in the area of arbitration insofar as they lack the
definitiveness that ordinarily characterizes the presently existing con-
troversy of a submission agreement.
Background
Until fairly recent times the submission agreements were almost
totally ineffective because of the quality of revocability which had
been attached to them.5 Likewise the more recent "future disputes"
agreements were almost totally disregarded because they permitted
parties to agree to arbitrate controversies which might develop after
the contract was made. In part, this unfavorable attitude, specifi-
cally towards submission agreements, dates back to a dictum of Lord
Coke in 1609, which expresses the inherent revocability of the au-
thority given to an arbitrator.6 In the 18th century a jealous desire
to preserve judicial jurisdiction generated the much-abused policy
basis of non-enforcement of arbitration agreements.7 "Ouster of the
courts' jurisdiction" became the prevalent basis in place of what were,
at least, plausible contract and agency principles.8
This doctrine of revocability and non-enforcement became so
imbedded in the common law that only legislative enactment could
effectively correct it.9 The first significant legislative effort was made
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court havingjurisdiction thereof." Ibid.
4 AmmuBcAN ARBiTRATioN AssocIATioN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATioN RtnIns 2(1954). A standard submission of existing disputes agreement is as follows:
"We the undersigned parties, hereby agree to submit to arbitration under
the dommercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
the following controversy: (cite briefly). We further agree that the
above controversy be submitted to (one) (three) Arbitrators selected
from the panels of Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association.
We further agree that we will faithfully observe this agreement and the
Rules and that we will abide by and perform any award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) and that a judgment of the Court having jurisdiction may
be entered upon the award." Ibid.
GKulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-83(2d Cir. 1942). See Sayre, Develokment of Commercial Arbitration Law,
37 YALE L.J. 595, 598-605 (1928).
6Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 5, at 982.
See Sayre, supra note 5, at 598-602.
7 Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 5, at 983.
s See Sayre, supra note 5, at 603-04.
9 H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), as cited in Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 5, at 985. Part of the report
reads:
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in England in 1889.10 This statute provided that submission agree-
ments could be irrevocable, but specifically reserved for judicial re-
view questions of law arising in the arbitration proceeding."
Prior to the New York enactment in 1920, which was the first
arbitration statute in the United States, 12 the courts followed the
English common law as a matter of course. 13 However, there had
been some lower federal court criticism of continuing a policy of
non-enforcement of submission agreements during this period. 14 The
severest criticism appears in a House of Representatives Committee
Report which was made prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act in 1925.15 Here was an indication that the pendulum of
thought was swiftly shifting in favor of at least submission agree-
ments. It would be well to point out that although the New York
and federal acts were some thirty years behind the English Act of
1889, they did not contain the reservation as to questions of law.16
A recent authority has summed up the maturity of arbitration
law in these words:
The jealousy and suspicion with which the law was once apt to regard arbi-
tration have been succeeded by an attitude of tolerance and benevolence. The
legislature has intervened to implement arbitration agreements and to enable
the force of judgments to be given to arbitration awards, and the judges have
evinced a readiness to construe generously the powers given to arbitration by
statute, and to overlook irregularities where no miscarriage of justice is in-
"An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other con-
tracts, where it belongs .... This jealousy survived for so long a period
that the principle became firmly imbedded in the English common law
and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt
that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legis-
lative enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule and
recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it . . ."
10 Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49. See Ellenbogen, English
Arbitration Practice, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 656, 658 (1952).1 Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49; Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 n.8 (2d Cir. 1942). The Uniform
Arbitration Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1925. Like the English Act it provided that either
party could petition the courts to determine questions of law. See WHITNEY,
MODERN COMMERCIAL PRAcricEs §440, at 628 (1958).
12 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 11,
at 984.
13 Ibid.
14 See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319 (S.D.N.Y.
1921), aff'd, 5 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1924); United States Asphalt Refining Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
15 H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925), as cited in Kulukundis
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (Zd Cir. 1942).
This report characterized the old attitude towards arbitration as "an anachronism
of our American law."
"I See Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J.
595, 613 (1928).
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volved. Indeed, the judges have frequently expressed their reluctance to be
invoked at all by a party to an arbitration agreement .... 17
Incidents of the "Future Disputes" Agreement
Whether the agreement takes the form which makes all con-
troversies referable to the contract arbitrable or which specifically
limits the arbitrable issues,' 8 the legal relationship of the parties is
definitively altered.
Under the usual type of statute the parties acquire the right to
stay legal proceedings pending the arbitration.'9 Specific enforce-
ment of the arbitration agreement is available 20 in addition to court
appointment of arbitrators, where necessary.2 1 As to outcome, the
arbitration award has the effect and validity of a judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction.22
Besides these statutory incidents there are many others, peculiar
to the arbitration process itself. In this process there is a lack of
the benefit of judicial instruction on the law 23 which is compensated,
in part, by the competency of a specialized arbitrator, who may be
better equipped to unravel the ofttimes perplexing fact disputes of a
commercial controversy.2 4  Also, the procedure is less formal,25 the
rules of evidence 2 6 are liberalized and the strict judicial doctrines
pertaining to burden of proof27 and testimony under oath 28 are
relaxed. Beneath these surface deficiencies, however, lie the desiderata
of the arbitration process. The procedure is designed for facility
17 See Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
656, 658 (1952).
is See KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACrION 69 (1941).
'19 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1451.
20 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 1450. The Uni-
form Arbitration Act contains no such direct provisions in this respect. Of
greater importance, however, is the fact that its provisions relate only to sub-
missions and thereby leave agreements to arbitrate "future disputes" unenforce-
able as they were at common law. See WHITNEY, MODERN COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES §440, at 628 (1958).
21 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) ; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1452.
22 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 13 (1958) ; N.Y. Civ. PR~c. ACT § 1465.
23 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
24 See Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration--A Preliminary In-
quiry, 17 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 698, 701, 707 (1952).2 5 AmERIcAx ARBITRATION AssociATION, A BUSINESSMAN'S GuiDE To CoM-
M&ERCIAL ARBITRATION 11 (1958).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. In effect, there is no legal burden of proof. The normal procedure
requires each party to the arbitration to present his complete case; the burden
is actually on both.2 8 AmERiCAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 5 (1951). Testimony under oath may be taken but under the
arbitration rules this is entirely discretionary with the arbitrator(s).
190]
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and is geared to the particular case and parties.2 9 Speed is an essen-
tial part of the process. Contrast the ordinary award which is ren-
dered within a few weeks with the prolonged wait which is encoun-
tered when a case is placed on a congested court calendar.8 0 Another
favorable characteristic is inexpensiveness: ordinarily expert wit-
nesses are not required, there are no jury fees, no court costs, no
expensive stenographic records and no costly transcripts of record on
appeal.81 Finally, limited review 32 provides finality, which is so
necessary in the commercial world.
Scope of the "Future Disputes" Agreement
A "future disputes" agreement may be limited in scope by:
(1) general contract principles, (2) legislative enactments and
(3) the agreement, itself.
1. General Principles
One of the general principles applied to a "future disputes"
agreement is that the validity of the agreement itself is initially sub-
ject to judicial determination. If this were not so, this anomaly
would result.8 3 If the validity of the agreement is considered as an
arbitrable issue then a ruling in arbitration that the agreement was
invalid would destroy the arbitral jurisdiction with the logical result
that the ruling would be a nullity.84 Other general non-arbitrable
issues which do not normally present great problems include illegal
claims,35 claims which arise from a violation of criminal or penal
statutes and claims which are contrary to a strong public policy.36
29 See Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary In-
quiry, 17 LAw & CoxrNEmp. PROB. 698, 700 (1952).
30See WHITNEY, MODERN COMMERCIAL PRArcEs § 440, at 623-24 (1958).
This observation may be somewhat exaggerated in the light of these facts.
In the New York County Supreme Court, January, 1960 commercial jury cases
are now being tried while commercial non-jury cases are up to date. In the
Kings County Supreme Court the calendars are not so up to date. Commercialjury cases from June, 1958 are now being tried while the non-jury cases are
up to date.31 Id. at 624.
32 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
33 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F2d 978,
986 (2d Cir. 1942). See also Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law:
Comnpdsion as Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARv. L. Rnv. 1258,
1271 (1933).
34 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 33.
35 See STuRGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs § 60, at 202 (1930).36 Id. at 203.
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2. Legislation
In the legislative area the Federal Arbitration Act will first be
examined. Though there was diversity of opinion as to its scope,
3 7
it is a presently settled principle that the act is specifically limited to
agreements in contracts evidencing a "maritime" or "commerce"
transaction.38 In addition, contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce are specifically excluded from the scope of the act.3 9
This specificity is, indeed, lacding in the area of conflict of laws.
Herein lies the most uncertain limitation of the Federal Arbitration
Act because there is difficulty in ascertaining whether the act is of
a procedural or substantive nature 40 upon which the applicability of
the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 41 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 
42
doctrines depends.
43
The one settled principle in this area seems to be that the act
does not provide a separate basis of federal jurisdiction so that if
it is to be applied at all it will be because the parties have some
other basis for resorting to the federal courts.44 Section 4 of the act
specifically indicates this principle by providing that jurisdiction will
be in "any United States district court which, save for such agree-
ment, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in
admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy
between the parties .... ,, 45 As will become apparent, the problem
involved in applying the statute is most acute where jurisdiction is
bottomed on diversity of citizenship.
46
Up to fairly recent times arbitration has been considered as a
law of remedies. 47  The classic statement of judge Cardozo, when
37 For example, the Second Circuit construed § 3 of the act, which provided
for a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration, to be separable from
the rest of the act, thereby applying it to all arbitration agreements. The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that §§ 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a
whole thereby making the restrictive clause of "maritime" or "commerce"
transaction in § 2 equally applicable to § 3. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.
of America, 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956).
38 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, supra note 37.
309 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
40 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959).
41304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42326 U.S. 99 (1945).
43 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
44 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., supra note 40, at
408.
45 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
46 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959). In the Bernhardt case, this difficulty is clearly indicated in both
the majority and concurring opinions, especially as it relates to the application
of the Erie and Guaranty Trust doctrines. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
47271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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the validity of the New York Arbitration Act was sustained in
Berkovitz v. Arbib and Houlberg, Inc.,48 enunciated this attitude
concisely:
The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of promises to arbitrate is
part of the law of remedies ... The rule to be applied is the rule of the
forum. Both in this court and elsewhere, the law has been so declared. Arbi-
tration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not
a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow. This
statute did not attach a new obligation to sales already made. It vindicated
by a new method the obligation then existing.49
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America 50 a significant de-
parture from that strict attitude was indicated. The petitioner sought
damages for wrongful discharge under an employment contract con-
taining a "future disputes" agreement. The action was instituted in
the state court in Vermont and then removed to the district court
on grounds of diversity of citizenship. Defendant then moved to
stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration 51 and the Court held
that the stay could not be granted because the agreement did not
satisfy the "maritime" or "commerce" requirement of the act.52  But
the Court went further by stating that since the case was based on
diversity jurisdiction the Erie and Guaranty Trust doctrines would
govern, making state law applicable. In this respect the Court also
rejected the previously existing judicial attitude that arbitration "is
merely a form of trial," finding that "the remedy by arbitration ...
substantially affects the cause of action created by the State" 53 so
that the outcome must not differ from that of the state court, had
the suit been brought there.54
It appears, therefore, that the Arbitration Act is neither pro-
cedural nor substantive but a combination of both. In effect, it is
what may be termed an accommodation statute because parties, hav-
ing an independent basis for jurisdiction, are offered remedies which
will substantially affect their rights.55
48230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
49 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 270, 130 N.E. 288,
289-90 (1921). (Emphasis added.)
50350 U.S. 198 (1956).
51This was done pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §3 (1958).52 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
531d. at 203. (Emphasis added.)
54 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, supra note 52.
55 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959). The inadequacy of the procedure-substance dichotomy has been
much emphasized. The Sapreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. Rxv. 137,
140-41 (1956). For example:
"A decision whether to grant a stay of judicial proceedings until arbi-
tration, is, in effect, a decision whether plaintiff is to have a judicial or
arbitral remedy for the alleged wrong. Although matters of remedy are
in some contexts considered procedural, in light of the many significant
[ VOL. 34
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Against this background three significant cases have been de-
cided. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Air Bd. 6 the plaintiffs sought judgments declaring that certain lease
agreements had expired and that the "future disputes" agreement was
invalid. The action was commenced in the state courts of Kentucky
and then removed to the district court on grounds of diversity of
citizenship. The district court denied defendant's motion to stay the
proceedings and order arbitration. In affirming this denial the Sixth
Circuit finds that congressional intent clearly indicates the creation
of an accommodation statute and that there is no intention that
federal law will be determinative of fraud in the inducement. This
court, following the directive of Bernhardt, holds that the district
court properly applied the state law of Kentucky. Under that law
the agreement was invalid and therefore the court never reached the
question of whether the "commerce" or "maritime" requirement was
met.5
7
The Ninth Circuit made a similar ruling a few months after the
Bernhardt decision in Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.58
The controversy concerning the national distribution of a film was
held to satisfy the "commerce" requirement of the act and therefore
under Bernhardt, California state law was applied to the "future
disputes" agreement in the primary contract.59
However, a contrary result was recently reached by the Second
Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.60 The
differences between judicial and arbitral proceedings the enforceability of
such a remedy can so substantially affect the vindication of a party's
rights that it may be a matter of substance under the constitutional
requirements of Erie." Ibid.
The Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1958), presents
a somewhat analogous situation. That act, like the Arbitration Act, has no
separate basis of federal jurisdiction within itself. See Canadian Indem. Co.
v. Republic Inden. Co., 222 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1955); Goldstein v. Johnson,
184 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1950). It has been declared "procedural only," Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), yet the Court that made
that pronouncement was quick to realize that this new type of relief also
substantially affected the rights of the parties. Id. at 241. Professor Borchard
has made this summary of the Declaratory Judgments Act: "it has the ad-
vantage of escaping the technicalities associated with equitable and extraordi-
nary remedies, thus enabling the substantive goal to be reached in the speediest
and most inexpensive form." See Borchard, The Federal Declaratory J.udg-
ments Act, 21 VA. L. Rav. 35, 38 (1934). It is submitted that this indicates
the sd getteris nature of both the Arbitration Act and the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.
56 American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269
F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959). See note 74, infra.
5 Ibid.58236 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956).
IM Ibid.60271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). This court did not consider the American
Airlines case, supra note 56, and it dismissed Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox
1960 ]
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fact situation in this case satisfactorily met the "commerce" require-
ment of the act; in Bernhardt neither the "commerce" nor "maritime"
requirement was met. Like the Bernhardt case, however, jurisdic-
tion in Lawrence was bottomed on diversity of citizenship. On a
motion to stay judicial proceedings the court held that a federal sub-
stantive law governed and that under that law fraud in the induce-
ment was an arbitrable issue.61 This court states that the position
that arbitration as part of the law of remedies is losing much of its
fascination in modern times because mere catchwords do not suffice
in declaring the law. 62  But then the court uses that same device in
declaring its position. Relying on Bernhardt's rejection of arbitra-
tion as "merely a form of trial," the Second Circuit concludes that
arbitration is of a totally substantive nature.63 This interpretation
does not consider the third possibility that "arbitration is a composi-
tion of procedure and substance, while remaining a species of neither. 64
It is submitted that the court's reasoning fails for many reasons.
The court, first of all, distinguished the case from Bernhardt on the
ground that it satisfied the "commerce" requirement of the act; the
Bernhardt case was decided on the ground that it did not meet that
or the "maritime" requirement.6 5 Then it proceeds to establish the
theory that new federal substantive rights were created by the act.66
This is a novel theory though not entirely unique. In 1957 the
Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills 47 formulated a
federal substantive law in conjunction with the existing procedural
statute.68  Facing the more difficult problem of where this federal
substantive law was to be found, the Supreme Court stated that the
law would be drawn from the policy of our existing national labor
laws and specifically indicated the reliance that would be put on the
substantive parts of the Labor Management Relations Act.69 The
concurring opinion, although accepting the formulation of a sub-
stantive law, specifically rejected the majority's conclusion that it is
federal law. Nevertheless, the opinion adhered to the conclusion of
Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956), as being based on a misconstruction
of the Bernhardt ruling. Ibid.
68'Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959).
62 Ibid.
63 See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., supra note 61, at
405, 409.
64 See text accompanying note 55, sitpra.6 5 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
6 6 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-09
(2d Cir. 1959).
67 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
68 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19 Id. at 456-57. Brief for Respondent on Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
pp. 5-6, Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959), in citing the Lincoln Mills case fails to draw this distinction.
[ VOL. 34
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International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Mead 70 that some federal rights
may be involved in section 301 and that upon this ground the con-
stitutionality of the section was upheld by what has been termed
"protective jurisdiction." 71 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a vigorous
dissent, rejected the conclusion that the courts can formulate federal
substantive laws. In disagreeing with the concurring justices he
stated that even assuming the federal rights supposedly inherent in
section 301 he would find the section unconstitutional in this appli-
cation because those rights provided the sole basis for the exercise
of federal jurisdiction.72 From this summation of a very long and
difficult case it is clear that this area of the law is still unclear and
indefinite.
Yet the Second Circuit went one step further than the majority
in Lincoln Mills by spinning federal substantive law out of the Arbi-
tration Act without pointing to any fund of law upon which to draw.
The court in Lawrence could point to no such fund because there
are no national arbitration laws save as exist in the statutes at issue.
In effect, the Second Circuit decided that there was a federal sub-
stantive law in the act and then the court itself created that very
law, making it a mere arm of the Congress. As surprising as this
conclusion appears, the reasoning of the court in Lawrence leaves no
alternative solution.
As part of the authority for its theory the court relies heavily
upon a broad construction of congressional intent. This construction
is in direct conflict with the reasoning of American Airlines, Inc. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd.,73 the Sixth Circuit case,
which adopts a narrow interpretation of that intent.7 4 Since the
importance of the distinction between procedural and substantive
law, as indicated in the Erie decision, was thirteen years in the future
at the time of enactment, a narrow, cautious interpretation of the
act would seem to be the better approach. It took many years for
70230 F.?d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
7 1 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, .supra note 68, at 459-60.
72 Id. at 460, 469, 484.
73269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959). Summarizing the congressional intent the
court said:
"While the language ...might plausibly be read to support a broader
construction, consideration of the legislative history reveals that what the
Congress intended was merely to overrule by legislation long-standingjudicial precedent, which declared agreements to submit judicial contro-
versies to arbitration contrary to public policy, on the ground that enforce-
ment of such agreements would oust Te courts of their jurisdiction. Thus
the congressional purpose was to make arbitration agreements within the
scope of the Federal statute as effective [sic] enforceable as any other
contract, and so permit contracting parties thereby to avoid, if they chose
so to do, the 'delay and expense of litigation... !" Id. at 816.
74 Compare American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air
Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1959), with Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., supra note 69.
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Congress to finally enact arbitration laws; if those laws are now to
be given greater breadth, it should be accomplished through the
legislature and not through a broad judicial construction.
A double effect of the Lawrence case, which was the caution in
Bernhardt, bears mention. A prevailing reason for the existence of
the Erie and Guaranty Trust doctrines is to prevent and discourage
forum-shopping.75 But, Lawrence may afford a new opportunity to
choose a favorable jurisdiction to the extent that the diverse plaintiff
who is engaged in "commerce" may choose a more favorable sub-
stantive climate. The court's reply is that its theory is "a declara-
tion of national law equally applicable in state or federal courts." 76
The effect of this position presents the constitutional problems that
were forewarned by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opin-
ion to Bernhardt.77 The Second Circuit has explicitly chosen to
reject that position as unfounded despite growing authority that the
Erie doctrine rests not only on policy consideration but upon a strong
constitutional foundation.78
Finally, the court found that the allegation of fraud did not affect
the arbitration agreement which was separable from the primary
contract. 79 A separate allegation in relation to the arbitration agree-
ment, the court notes, was necessary in order to bring it within the
ambit of the principle that the validity of the arbitration agreement
is initially subject to judicial determination."0 The court enunciates
three reasons in support of its application of the separability doctrine:
(1) historical precedent, (2) favorable construction of the statute
and (3) the added factor that the Robert Lawrence Company had
incorporated an identical arbitration provision in its own order.8 '
Commercial usage, however, seems to be against the adoption of such
a doctrine because arbitration clauses have become so common that
they are rarely considered apart from the contract in the ordinary
transaction.8 2 The inspection of intent after the fact is, indeed, diffi-
cult but it tasks reason to accept that a businessman who is being
"taken in" will consider anything relating to the transaction as valid.
75 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956).
76 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d
Cir. 1959).
77 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, supra note 75, at 208. Recog-
nizing the possible constitutional basis for the Erie doctrine the opinion ques-
tions "whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation in the federal
courts which is there solely because it is 'between Citizens of different states,'
U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, in disregard of the law of the state in which a
federal court is sitting." Ibid.
78 See The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARV. L. RE.v. 137, 141 (1956).
79 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959).80 Ibid.
81 Id. at 404, 410.
82 Brief for Appellant on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 11, Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.. supra note 79.
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The ramifications of this case will not be fully understood for
many years but the Supreme Court will soon have the opportunity
of clarifying some of the most difficult aspects of this infant body
of law. Certiorari has been granted and two questions were certified:
(1) Does Federal Arbitration Act or does New York law gov-
ern validity of arbitration clause in contract made in New
York by Massachusetts buyer and New York seller that
requires interstate shipment of goods;
(2) Does Federal Arbitration Act require that dispute over
fraud in inception of contract be submitted to arbitration if
alleged fraud is not in connection with making of arbitra-
tion clause itself. s3
The limitations of the New York Arbitration Act, which rep-
resents the genesis of arbitration statutes in the United States,84 are
less stringent than the federal act. For many years, however, a very
broad limitation existed, which specifically prescribed that only jus-
ticiable controversies were arbitrable.85 Article 80-B of the Civil
Practice Act was intended to remedy this unfortunate situation but
instead the difficulty worsened.8 6 This anomaly resulted:
If the parties agree to a third party determination of a question without agree-
ing that the determination shall be made under the Arbitration Law, then in
the event of breach, the court must direct that it be determined by arbitration
under the Arbitration Law. But if the parties have expressly agreed to arbi-
trate, the agreement may be unenforceable, if the question is of the kind
involved in Matter of Kallus [non-justiciable controversy] ... .8T
In 1959 the legislature after many requests amended section 1448
to include any dispute whether justiciable or not.8 Presently then
the New York statute is very broad and there exist only some minor
83 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3238
(U.S. Feb. 16, 1960).
84 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
984 (2d Cir. 1942).
88 Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924) ; Matter of Kallus,
292 N.Y. 459, 55 N.E. 737 (1944) (decided after an attempted amendment to
§ 1448, which thereby proved fruitless).
s6 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 1340. See 1959 N.Y. LEs rATivE ANNUAL 17-18,
1959 Lxa. Doc. No. 65(E), MEMORANDUM, N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION.
87 See 1959 N.Y. LEnIsixArv ANNUAL 18-19, 1959 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E),
MEMORANDUM, N.Y. LAw REvisIox CoMMISSION.
88 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1448 was amended to read in part:
"Such submission or contract may include or be limited to questions arising
out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be col-
lateral, incidental, precedent, subsequent to or independent of any issue
between the parties, without regard to the justiciable character of such
questions or controversies." (Words in italics indicate 1959 amendment to
the section.)
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restrictions relating to capacity to agree and to disputes involving real
property held in fee for life.8 9
The New York Court of Appeals was faced with a problem
similar to that of the Lawrence case in Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v.
Plotnick.90 The claimant seeking damages for fraud in the inducement
and for breach of contract sought to have all the issues determined in
arbitration. The court granted the opposing motion to stay arbitration
pending a judicial determination of the claim for fraud in the induce-
ment. But the court, in reversing the Appellate Division and the
Supreme Court, relied heavily on the fact that the claimant while
alleging fraud in the inducement was simultaneously affirming the
contract in the claim for breach thereof.91 It is feasible that absent
this fact that case would have been decided differently in the light
of the reversal of two lower courts, coupled with the vigorous dissent
by Judge Burke, in which two other judges concurred. 92 Though
that distinguishing fact exists, the Second Circuit seems to have ex-
tended the principle of the Wrap-Vertiser case to mean that fraud
in the inducement, of itself, is not an arbitrable issue. The court's
own words in Lawrence are:
We note that were we compelled to apply New York law to the problems in-
volved in this case, we would have been forced to arrive at a contrary con-
clusion. Had this not been so, we would not have given such detailed
consideration to the choice of the applicable law. But the pattern and sub-
stance of New York law appear to be different than what we have found the
federal law to be.g8
It is submitted that the Lawrence case may be distinguishable from
the Wrap-Vertiser case on its facts and that therefore an unnecessary
path was taken around New York law by the Second Circuit, bearing
in mind, however, that the attitude of the New York courts does
appear somewhat narrower than that evidenced by the Second
Circuit.94
89 See N.Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 1448.
903 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957).
91 Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163
N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957).
92 For lower court cases in New York holding that fraud in the inducement
is an arbitrable issue, see Matter of Amerotron, 3 App. Div2d 899, 166 N.Y.S.2d
214 (1st Dep't 1957) (memorandum decision), aff'd mer., 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148
N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958); Matter of Pan American Trade De-
velopment Corp., N.Y.LJ., Aug. 21, 1957, p. 3, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The
latter opinion, inter alia, states:
"The Court is of the opinion that the intent of the parties and the lan-
guage of the arbitration agreement is broad enough to allow questions
with regard to prior dealings in-so-far as they are related to the contract,
to be decided by arbitration (Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp'n, 3 N.Y.2d
17, is not contrary)."
a3 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 412
(2d Cir. 1959).04 Ibid.
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3. The Agreement
The third limitation on scope is perhaps the easiest to deal with.
The agreement itself may limit the arbitral scope depending upon
the intention of the parties as evidenced by the type of agreement
employed. A problem of interpretation of the clause, be it general
or specific, arises here. The courts seem to have formulated a work-
able rule for this problem: arbitrators may interpret and select any
meaning which a reasonably intelligent person would accept, but a
meaning which no intelligent person would accept is void.9 5
Conclusion
As has been indicated the scope of a "future disputes" arbitra-
tion agreement may be broad or restricted, but in either case prob-
lems abound. Since questions of law under most of the American
arbitration statutes are determined in the arbitration itself, the
lawyer's significance is felt in the period when the contract is made.
Therefore, the best method of removing barriers and of gaining effec-
tive arbitration is through expert draftsmanship in drawing the
agreement. The penalty for failure in this respect is severe because
the benefits of the arbitration process are otherwise lost in the milieu
of arbitration, coupled with litigation.
THE TAXATION OF QUALIFIED ANNUITY PLANS AND DEFERRED
COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS TO THE EMPLOYEE
AND His BENEFICIARY
The effect of our progressive tax structure is to foster plans
which defer compensation to future years. Arrangements which
mitigate the effect of our high marginal rates have been sought after
with much vigor.' These plans are not inequitable. They provide
more spendable income and at a time in the future when the indi-
vidual's productive capacity has been curtailed. In recognition of
this the Internal Revenue Service in March, 1960 promulgated
Revenue Ruling 60-31 outlining the use of deferred compensation
plans. This article will consider the deferred compensation arrange-
95 Marceau, Are All Interpretations "Admissible", 12 Ama. J. (n.s.) 151(1957).
'For leading cases involving deferred compensation plans, see Casale v.
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Howard Veit, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 811 (1949).
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